Statement from IP3 Corporation
WASHINGTON, July 31, 2019 /PRNewswire-PRWeb/ -- The House Oversight Committee Majority Staffs Interim Staff report of July 29, 2019 seriously mischaracterizes the activities of IP3 Corporation, as well as the entire U.S. commercial nuclear power industry, regarding interactions with the U.S. Government in legitimately seeking U.S. Government support for exports of commercial nuclear power to the Middle East and elsewhere. The report attempts to characterize the interactions of Industry and the Government as obliterating the lines between the public and private sector. It demonstrates a lack of understanding about the close coordination that is required on complex programs such as civil nuclear power development. The policies and regulations that define civil nuclear cooperation are well understood and every interaction with both the U.S. Government and nations such as Saudi Arabia follow a closely prescribed body of law.
IP3 was formed in 2016, when it became clear there are many nations throughout Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as the Middle East, firmly intent on adopting nuclear power generation and that the U.S. is not adequately positioned to influence the important decisions by those nations regarding issues of non-proliferation and the safe and secure operation of nuclear power plants. IP3's principal concern is, and always has been, to ensure that all countries seeking to become users of commercial nuclear power adopt the highest possible standards of safe construction and operation and especially of safe-guarding the nuclear fuel cycle in order to avoid threats to health, safety, and geopolitical instability in their countries and their regions.
IP3 and the rest of the U.S. nuclear industry provided thousands of pages of documents to the Committee that incontrovertibly demonstrate our corporation's unequivocal commitment as well as the commitment of the U.S. nuclear energy industry to comply completely with all U.S. laws and policies in pursuing the safe and secure development of commercial nuclear power.
The U.S. policy goals of non-proliferation and the safe, secure development of civil nuclear power are unwavering. Each Administration supports programs they believe will best serve to meet those goals. The Obama Administration recognized this and lent its support to U.S. industry in discussions with Saudi Arabia and other nations in the Middle East about the construction and operation of nuclear energy plants in their countries. The Trump Administration is simply doing the same thing with the U.S. industry because the U.S. faces the same challenges now as it did under the Obama Administration, i.e., unless the U.S. is participating in nuclear energy development globally, there is an increased risk of proliferation or weaponization of nuclear fuels that would come from the U.S. abdicating its nuclear stewardship responsibilities and leaving the market to Russia and China.
With respect to the development of nuclear energy plants in Saudi Arabia and other Mid-East countries, the concept of a Middle East Marshall plan ? paid for by the governments of the Middle East ? has been articulated by multiple administrations including the Obama Administration. The interactions between IP3, the U.S. nuclear energy industry, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in December of 2016 were fully supported and facilitated by the Obama State department. In fact, IP3 has never met with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince (MBS), although the 2016 IP3 proposal to MBS released in the Majority staff's Interim Staff Report was provided to and supported by the Obama Administration and was seen as a wholly appropriate commercial endeavor, similar to hundreds of other commercial endeavors pursued by hundreds of other entities that work through our State Department.
The report uses innuendo and unfounded allegations from 2017 that the Trump administration, in concert with the U.S. nuclear energy Industry, was attempting to skirt prescribed policies in an attempt to transfer nuclear energy technology to Saudi Arabia. Thousands of documents provided to the committee have shown that all prescribed policies were followed and in no instance did IP3 or any company engaged in the solicitation for civil nuclear energy violate those laws or policies.
An unfortunate side effect of the Majority staff's Interim Staff Report is that it downplays the national importance of the future of the U.S. nuclear energy industry, the role of the United States in peaceful nuclear energy development globally, and the troubling commercial dominance by Russia and China in nuclear energy exports. Instead, this Report reduces the issue to political infighting and attacks on the Administration. One cannot help believing that this is precisely the outcome Russia and China were hoping for.
The report demonstrates a lack of understanding of the legal framework for nuclear technology transfers, the U.S. government's 123 agreement process, the part 810 approval process, and industry's role in those deliberations. Nuclear cooperation agreements are complicated international negotiations informed by many considerations.
IP3's focus is on helping develop a commercial plan that would improve the U.S. nuclear energy industry's chances of competing and winning against Russia and China globally. Without a competitive and robust commercial U.S. nuclear energy Industry, the government cannot achieve their policy goals of signing 123 agreements with other nations.
Discussions among government officials and policy experts, both Democrat and Republican, on the distinction between a 123 agreement and the so-called "Gold Standard" 123 agreement are ongoing. It is up to the Administration and Congress to achieve a 123 agreement with each nation pursuing nuclear energy programs with the U.S. If such an agreement can't be reached, then there will be no U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia's nuclear energy program. The Obama Administration worked for several years with Saudi Arabia to come to terms on a strong 123 agreement, and now the Trump administration is working on the same issue.
The report references inaccurate media reporting in several instances to imply that American companies were looking for ways to "clinch a deal" without the U.S. signing a 123 agreement or that a 123 agreement would not be required if the U.S. partnered with a Korean company. This is simply false. There was never any discussion of joining with Korea as a way to avoid the requirement for a section 123 agreement. In fact, any alliance with our allies in commercial nuclear energy development would require that each country adhere to U.S. non-proliferation policies, which strengthen the ability of our government to guarantee a 123 agreement is required, whether it's a U.S. or Korean-led project.
The Majority staff's interim report on the President's February 2019 meeting with IP3 and 10 CEO's from the U.S. nuclear energy industry was mischaracterized as an effort to influence the Trump Administration with respect to transfer of U.S. nuclear technology to the Saudis. However, the meeting was not about Saudi Arabia. Rather, the meeting was designed to discuss the many challenges the industry is facing both domestically and more importantly internationally in its ability to compete. To characterize this meeting as a further attempt to transfer nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia without following prescribed policies is simply false and misleading. A more accurate characterization of the Official White House Photo released in this Majority Staff Interim Staff Report and the immediate post- meeting press availability by 3 CEO's in front of the West Wing would have been that the February meeting with the President demonstrates the level of transparency by the industry and close coordination required between industry and government.
Despite providing clear documentary evidence since 2017 that LTG Mike Flynn was never an advisor to IP3, never joined the company as an employee, was never compensated by the company, and had no stake in the company, the Majority staff's Interim Staff Report continues to imply he was an advisor to IP3 from June to December of 2016 ? a falsehood of which the staff is fully aware, having seen the documentary evidence multiple times.
A far more balanced report was issued one week earlier (July 22, 2019) by the Minority staff of the Oversight Committee that was based on a review of the exact same documents and evidence reviewed by the Majority staff and that more accurately described the activities of the U.S. Industry.
IP3 and its Industry partners support the concept of an alliance with our allies (U.K., Korea, Japan, Canada, France, Australia) as the only way to compete with the State-Owned Enterprises of Russia and China. This alliance would allow the strengths of our individual industries to come together in a best-of-breed model. This U.S.-led, ally-supported, commercial structure would strengthen our policy goals in nuclear non-proliferation, improve the consortium's opportunities to compete in the rapidly growing international nuclear energy market, and enhance our bilateral relationships with our allies in clean energy solutions.
SOURCE IP3 International
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